The US trade deficit has soared in the last 2 months and is almost back at its "front-running' (of liberation day) levels -- annualized the non-petrol August goods deficit was $1.7 trillion or so 1/ https://t.co/JvMK3f2qKe
Far-left presidential candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon accuses the head of France's central bank of an “act of treason” a day after the central banker, Emmanuel Moulin, warned that the country risked being "strangled by interest rates" if it didn't address its public finances. 引用 @JLMelenchon:Le banqui
I am certainly expecting goods deficits of 5% of GDP or more and goods and services deficits of 4% of GDP or more for the remainder of the year. Momentum on import side is clear ... notwithstanding Trump's tariffs 3/3 https://t.co/JPaVCd4fUl
To repeat an old line, in the battle between Trump's tariffs and conventional macroeconomics, conventional macroeconomics is currently winning. The August goods and services deficit was bigger than any deficit apart from those deficits associated with tariff front running 1/ https://t.co/MPrPSGOSh
The 2025-26 U.S. tariffs have renewed the question of how much of a tariff reaches consumers, and how quickly. In today's post, the authors trace tariffs through import, domestic producer, and retail prices for U.S. consumer goods. https://t.co/qKgJSPqQKq
The TIC (US capital flow) data is lagged and there isn't any number for August yet. The last strong print for Treasuries was in May; June and July were weak. But it sure looks like the world wants to finance San Francisco much than it wants to finance DC right now 2/2 https://t.co/yfjkrSBup4
The US is now running -- see the August data - a 4% of GDP goods and services trade deficit. How is that being financed -- strong foreign demand for US risk assets ... 1/2 https://t.co/NUsmoSJYRh
I am more open to a European 301 than Mr. Lamy -but do want to better understand how a "“structural rebalancing instrument” would work. I have also been thinking about some kind of special safeguard tied to macroeconomic imbalances, which sounds similar EU wheels are moving
"the European Commission has no direct tool to respond to currency undervaluation and the European Central Bank does not treat trade-related currency misalignment as part of its role. So currency policy must also become part of Europe’s trade strategy" Pascal Lamy, in the
Gosh, $200/bbl oil? Who would ever put such an outrageous number out there... 😅 引用 @OilHeadlineNews:Vitol chief warns of tanker shortage and risk of $200-a-barrel oil Head of world’s largest independent oil trader says shipping squeeze is creating new bottleneck despite increased Gulf flows @sta
Early in the war I wondered why we didn't see more ships risking the journey across Hormuz for big profits despite obvious danger Easily enough spread—early in the war Gulf oil prices were functionally negative—to pay for sky-high insurance & crew hazard pay Well, we got there: https://t.co/f8IwKE
Peter Harrell on the Franco-German proposals to strengthen Europe's response to the second China shock 引用 @petereharrell:Lets unpack the new Franco-German paper proposing fundamental changes to how the EU manages trade policy and which, if implemented, would mark the most significant change to EU-C
I do think tariff differentials matter, not just the absolute level -- and so do America's trade partners. Everyone last year negotiated to get a slightly lower tariff than their neighbors/ trade competitors. The impact of 12.5% on China was muted by going to 10% on almost
Good morning. From the FT: "A sharp sell-off in US government bonds is starting to reverberate across corporate America, forcing companies to overhaul their borrowing plans and even raising the spectre of defaults among the most lowly rated businesses." Remember the historical https://t.co/tzvwm7W2N
Red dye will be added to all US diesel for both broad highway fuel tax relief and to remind voters of which colour to vote for in the midterms. 引用 @DeItaone:TRUMP TO UNVEIL PLAN ON RED-DYED DIESEL ON MONDAY: OFFICIALS
so we are where we are ... US manufacturing and ag exports are down 2.5% of GDP from their levels in the 1990s ... and are incredibly small v the US economy (~ 4 % of GDP) ... and that decline hasn't actually been offset by growing IP exports (even counting "irish" FDI profits) https://t.co/LZqI4SJo
It also seems obvious to me that "China" together with the dollar's strength (especially v Asia) explains why manufacturing output stopped growing with overall output after 2000 (a break from 70 to 99 ...) (the rising real deficit in goods indicates this wasn't just a shift in https://t.co/uCTcqXPM
A few comments on the China shock debate, from a more "macro" point of view that sets aside the vicious debate about "identification" -- There was clearly a downturn in manufacturing output around the time of China's WTO entry (it doesn't recover til 06/07) 1/ https://t.co/MWnemz6KXK
China has the capacity to produce 50-55 million cars -- The domestic market has fallen from ~ 25m cars to ~20 m cars this year China could easily export 2-3m cars to the US AND its 1.5m cars to Europe https://t.co/3rQ50C7jvW 引用 @BaldingsWorld:One of my favorite parts of this is most everyone miss
Hormuz oil flows rose to their highest level of the war and then the number of successful Iranian strikes on Hormuz tankers spiked over the past week, Hormuz flow appearing to slow somewhat. Had heard that even before this latest escalation CENTCOM was regularly intercepting
Some questions I have about the recent escalation of Iranian strikes: https://t.co/hsAzkec3dE 引用 @Rory_Johnston:Hormuz oil flows rose to their highest level of the war and then the number of successful Iranian strikes on Hormuz tankers spiked over the past week, Hormuz flow appearing to slow somewh
China rebalanced away from property investment and back toward exports -- bigly. numbers are very clear That is the issue that the world (apart from the US President, who prefers to dream of arches, golf courses and ballrooms) is now confronting in various ways https://t.co/7kD46OJFMa 引用 @Balding
France &Germany recognize that their trade defenses will always be tested absent a significant adjustment in the RMB -- (they are 100% right that broad rebalancing won't happen without exchange rate adjustment; there isn't a strong link now between Chinese demand growth and https://t.co/ibENlkkL5b
I did not realize it was controversial in some quarters that changes in the overall trade balance lead to changes in the composition of employment and output (and since sectoral employments tends to be concentrated, pronounced regional shifts) 2/2 https://t.co/vvW1Vq6FLS 引用 @Brad_Setser:A few com
Standard ballpark calculations would support the argument that the surge in Chinese imports (~1 pp pf GDP, which drove a similar increase in non oil imports) would lead to a reduction in manufacturing employment of ~ 1m (1/4 of the 3.5 or so lost in early 00s) ... especially as 引用 @joefrancis505:Th
and kind of shocked that there isn't general recognition that the ten years after China entered the WTO were not in aggregate great years for the US economy (jobless recovery, housing bubble fueled by imbalances, global financial crisis, great recession) -- certainly they weren't